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While business and trade policy focus on expanding commercial opportunities and mak-
ing a profit both policies benefit from adherence to certain values and rules. American
companies seek certain assurances when operating in foreign countries, including respect
for the rule of law (honoring contracts, arbitration of disputes, objective legal systems,
transparency (objective, uniform, predictable regulation), protection of intellectual property
rights, and restraints on conduct that generates commercial uncertainty, such as corruption
and nepotism. Without stable and predictable conditions, it is more difficult for U.S. com-
panies to operate successfully. At the same time, the absence of the rule of law, or a weak
and ineffective rule of law, limits a nation's economic opportunities by undermining its
ability to attract investors or expand trade. As a result, the lack of an effective rule of law
constrains a country's economic growth, reduces living standards, and significantly limits
the opportunities afforded to its people.
Expanding the World Trade Organization's (WTO) traditional focus on tariff and non-
tariff trade barriers to encompass a rule of law agenda would offer a classic win-win op-
portunity for U.S. trade policy, the WTO, and the citizens of impoverished developing
countries. Such an initiative would expand trade and investment opportunities for U.S.
companies, workers, farmers, and service providers, who stand to benefit from a strength-
ened rule of law that expands opportunities in markets around the world, while facilitating
economic growth and higher living standards in poor developing countries. At the same
time, the developing countries would benefit from increased trade, foreign direct invest-
ment, access to capital, and technology, while their people would gain from greater pre-
dictability and protection against abuses of government power, at least in the commercial
arena and perhaps beyond.
*Warren Maruyama is a trade lawyer with Hogan & Hartson in Washington, D.C. He served previously as
Associate Director (1992) and Deputy Associate Director (1989-1991) for International Economic Policy on
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Such an approach also could offer a way to bridge the anti-globalization divide. In Seattle,
Genoa, and Washington, D.C., protestors have challenged the role of multilateral economic
institutions, such as the WTO, IMF, G-8, and World Bank. The extreme and sometimes
violent character of the trade and globalization debate is unfortunate. While some of the
concerns and criticisms of the anti-globalization protestors are legitimate, their claims that
trade, the WTO, and economic globalization are bad for the world's poor and for human
rights are demonstrably wrong. A rule of law initiative could offer tangible proof that U.S.
trade policy and WTO negotiations can support long-term progress on issues closely tied
to freedom, human rights, and democracy-values supported by all Americans.
There is abundant evidence that an open trading system goes hand-in-hand with progress
toward democracy, economic freedom, and the rule of law. In Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, and
Chile, trade liberalization and an empowered middle class have supported political and
economic reforms, free elections, and vibrant democracy. In these countries, an open, grow-
ing, diversified free market economy supported progress toward democracy and the rule of
law. In all regions of the world, economic liberalization, open trade, and market-oriented
reforms have been accompanied by long-term progress toward democratic institutions and
the rule of law.' Professor Seymour Martin Lipset described the relationship as follows:
One of the most powerful factors that alters political beliefs and values and increases the
prospects for stable democracy is socioeconomic development... Overwhelmingly, the weight
of the evidence confirms a strong positive relationship between democracy and socioeconomic
development and that this relationship is causal in at least one direction: Higher levels of devel-
opment generate a significantly higher probability of democracy and of stable democracy.2
In contrast, closed and isolated economies, such as North Korea and Cuba, are often ac-
companied by significant abuses of human rights.
Market-oriented economic development appears to trigger far-reaching social changes
that indirectly undermine authoritarian rule. These include enhanced educational oppor-
tunities driven by increased demand for trained managers and technicians, expanded access
to information, the opening of society and culture to outside influences and ideas, the
breakdown of concentrated economic power in the hands of the state or a narrow elite, and
the emergence of an independent and entrepreneurial middle class. The latter development
has profound long-term political implications. Authoritarian governments frequently draw
power from a relatively narrow elite, such as the land-holding families of Latin America,
or the Communist political cadres of former Soviet bloc. A well-educated, independent
middle class that is not dependent on the state is thus more able to challenge authoritarian
control. As Professor Lipset explains:
Economic development also tends to alter the relationship between state and society, to in-
crease the number and variety of independent organizations that check the state and broaden
political participation, and to reduce corruption, nepotism, and state control over jobs and
opportunities to accumulate wealth. Finally, economic development thrusts a country into ever
1. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPsET, POLITICAL MvAN (2d ed., Doubleday 1981) (1960); Henry S. Rowen, The Short
March: China's Road to Democracy, The National Interest (Fall 1996); RONALD A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICI-
PATION AND OPPOSITION (Yale Univ. Press 1971); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in
the Late Twentieth Century, in 4 Julian J. Rothbaun Distinguished Lecture Series (1993).
2. LARRY DIAMOND ET AL., POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COMPARING EXPERIENCES WITH DEMOCRACY
(2d ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers 1995).
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greater cultural and economic integration with a world whose most desired markets, capital,
goods, technology, and ideas are controlled primarily by democracies.'
Dr. Henry Rowen, a Stanford professor and former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the
Reagan administration, has charted the relationship between economic development and
political freedom, showing a strong correlation between per capita income and freedom in
Asia:
4
Growing wealth is accompanied by increased education, the building of business and govern-
ment institutions with some autonomy, and the formation of attitudes that enable democratic
governments to survive when they have a chance at power. Spain, Portugal, Chile and Argen-
tina, in addition to Taiwan and Korea, all made the transition to democracy when they were
within this [$5,000 to $6,000 per capita] income range.'
Economic development requires investment, capital equipment, worker training, infra-
structure, education, technology, and functioning markets, but it also benefits from the rule
of law and from political and judicial systems that promote stability, fairness, and transpar-
ency. As Professor Debora Spar of Harvard University put it:
American firms' normal business procedures incorporate a sort of grassroots meritocracy and
openness not found in many host-country companies. U.S. and Western multinationals reward
employees based on performance, not out of patronage or other non-professional considera-
tions. They tend to treat local unions respectfully, demonstrating to populations lacking in
basic freedoms that representation and negotiation are concepts that can work. Multinationals
emphasize training and workplace benefits, further reinforcing the idea that every individual
has intrinsic potential and human dignity6
This phenomenon reflects U.S. and European best managerial practices and corporate
culture, but there is an even more compelling force at work. As a matter of self-interest,
American and European businesses, like businesses everywhere, benefit from stable and
predictable conditions, an effective rule of law, and effective checks and balances on gov-
ernment power.
Developing countries and ordinary working people also benefit. In a key study, Harvard
Professors Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner showed that developing countries with open
economies grew by 4.5 percent per year in the 1970s and 1980s, while those with closed
economies grew at an annual rate of 0.7 percent.7 A growing body of economic literature
also shows that corruption significantly impairs economic performance and lowers living
standards in all regions of the world.' In a pathbreaking study of judicial systems and
3. Id.
4. Rowen, supra note 1, at 68.
5. Id, at 69.
6. MICHAEL NOVAK, BUSINESS AS A CALLING: WORK AND THE EXAMINED LIFE 160 (Free Press, 1996) (quoting
Debora L. Spar).
7. Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew Warner, Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration, 95 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcTIVITY 1 (1995); David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Trade, Growth, and Poverty 27, The
World Bank (2001) ("The evidence from individual cases and from cross-country analysis supports the view
that globalization leads to faster growth and poverty reduction in poor countries."); Jeffrey A. Frankel & David
Romer, Does Trade Cause Growth? 89 AMER. ECON. REV. 379 (1999); Douglas A. Irwin & Marko Tervio, Does
Trade Raise Income? Evidence from the Twentieth Century, 58 J. OF INT'L EcoN. 1 (2002).
8. Marcos F. Gonqalves de Silva et al., How Does Corruption Hurt Growth? Evidences about the Effects of
Corruption on Factors Productivity and Per Capita Income, EAES/FGV-SP's NPP ("The chief conclusion is that
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economic performance, Robert Sherwood, Geoffrey Shepherd, and Celso Marcos de Souza
concluded that weak, inadequate, or corrupt judicial systems constrain economic growthY
An effective judicial system forces civic responsibility on all members of society, which
provides a platform from which inter-personal relations with strangers can be undertaken
with some confidence. Effective judicial arrangements offer every individual the opportu-
nity to secure private rights and the expectation to have them sustained in the case of conflict
or challenge, state interference, invasion, or other attacks. From the perspective of eco-
nomic activity, impersonal commercial transactions have more prospect of flourishing.
In other words, as a developing country shifts from an economy based on personal re-
lationships to modern commercial transactions, which require bringing together multiple
independent actors, including foreign investors with access to capital or technology, legal
reforms are required to protect long-term economic expectations and growth. Otherwise,
there is a significant cost. Sherwood calculated that countries "suffer at least a 15% penalty
in their growth momentum if their judicial systems are weak."' 0 This preliminary estimate
has been borne out by subsequent economic studies.
In a study for the World Bank, Professor Edwin Mansfield surveyed the impact of in-
tellectual property rules on investment decisions by 100 major U.S. multinational corpo-
rations." He found that foreign direct investment, particularly in advanced innovative tech-
nologies, is closely tied to effective intellectual property laws and enforcement:
corruption negatively affects the wealth of a nation by reducing capital productivity, or its effectiveness")
(Gonqalves et al. calculate that for eighty-one countries the average income per worker would increase 26
percent if corruption were reduced to the level of the top country on the scale-Denmark. For Brazil, income
per Brazilian worker would increase by $5,208.21.); Engr. Zaheer Mirza, Corruption ofNon-Performance, Busi-
NESS, Nov. 12, 2001, available at http://www.dawn.com/2001/11/12/ebr3.htm ("We may estimate the loss to
[Pakistan's] national economy due to various categories of corruption. The first category of financial corruption
is estimated to inflict a loss of about Rsl00 billion per annum to the country."); Aymo Brunetti et al., Institutions
in Transition: Reliability of Rules and Economic Performance in Former Socialist Countries, at http://www.
worldbank.org/htm[/dec/publications/workpapers/wps I 000series/wps 1 809/wpsl 809_abstract.html (lastvisited
Aug. 22, 2003) ("The results suggest that differences in the degree of predictability of the institutional frame-
work may indeed be an important factor in explaining differences in foreign direct investment as well as
differences in economic growth across transitional economies."); Aminur Rahman et al., Estimating the Effects
of Corruption: Implications for Bangladesh, Corruption in Bangladesh: Costs and Cures, The World Bank (2000)
("Thus, literally speaking, our results indicate that if Bangladesh were able to reduce corruption levels to those
found in the more advanced East European countries (i.e. Poland or Hungary) holding other things constant,
its corresponding annual average growth rate during 1990-97 could have been increased by between 1.65-2.14
percentage points. Achieving these rates of growth over the post-independence period would have resulted in
per capita GNP of between US$524-587 (in 1995 constant $US) in 1997, compared to its actual per capita
GNP of US$350."); T. M. Fitzpatrick & J. Kenison, The Impact of Corruption on Foreign Direct Investment:
Corruption Perceptions Index and Rates of Foreign Investment, available at http://www.transparency.org (last visited
Aug. 22, 2003) ("In every regression performed on Foreign Direct Investment where the CPI value was included
as an independent variable the coefficient was found positive. This indicates that countries with lower levels of
corruption (higher CPI scores) have a rate of Foreign Direct Investment that is higher as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product. This study now provides additional support to the findings of the Pablo Mauro study of
1995 that concluded that corruption and foreign direct investment are significantly correlated at the 10%
p-value level.").
9. Robert M. Sherwood et al., Judicial Systems and Economic Performance, Working Paper, available at
http://www.iris.umd.edu/news/conferences/tinker/tinjsepl.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2003).
10. Id.
11. Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer, The
World Bank (1994), available at http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/wdscontactserver/WDSP/I B/I 994/02/
01/000009265_39703 11123634/Rendered/PDF/multi-page.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2003).
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Taken at face value, a 10-point increase in our index seems to be associated with a decrease in
U.S. direct investment in manufacturing of about $200 million per year. In interpreting this
result, one should recognize that a country's system of intellectual property protection is in-
extricably bound up with its entire legal and social system and its attitudes toward private
property.I
Professor Mansfield concludes that the "strength or weakness of a country's system of
intellectual property protection seems to have a substantial effect, particularly in high-
technology industries, on the kinds of technology transferred by many U.S. firms to that
country." 3 The National Economic Research Associates (NERA) reached a similar conclu-
sion, finding that countries with strong intellectual property systems experience higher rates
of economic growth. 4 In other words, no multinational company is going to put innovative
proprietary technologies-effectively its crown jewels-at risk in markets where intellectual
property laws and enforcement are weak. As a result, countries with inadequate intellectual
property and legal systems will experience difficulty moving up the global value chain from
manufacturing and assembly of cheap labor-intensive products, such as textiles, apparel, and
consumer goods, to advanced research, development, and production of innovative tech-
nologies, such as semiconductors, software, biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals. In effect,
they will remain "developing" countries.
H. Making the WTO Negotiations into a Tool for Progress
toward the Rule of Law
To date, most of the discussions about the rule of law in the WTO have focused on
institutional reform of the WTO itself. Such reforms would strengthen the WTO's legit-
imacy and bolster public understanding of, and confidence in, its decision-making, particu-
larly the dispute settlement system. 5 However, such measures, by themselves, would not
directly address improved adherence to the rule of law by individual WTO Members.
The WTO, however, could easily become a tool for improving the rule of law around
the world. This approach would require bringing rule of law issues into future trade ne-
gotiations, such as the Doha Round, which was launched in 2001 and is scheduled to finish
in 2005. Various WTO Agreements already contain numerous "rule of law"-related obli-
gations. As a result, the WTO Agreements incorporate many rule of law concepts, such as
transparency, objective and impartial administration of laws, effective enforcement, judicial
review, and rights of appeal. However, these issues have never been taken up in a systematic
way, nor has there been any scrutiny of specific improvements in individual countries' legal,
administrative, and regulatory systems and procedures. Instead, most WTO rule of law
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection, New York:
National Economic Research Associates, Inc, Working Paper 3, June 1990.
15. For example, W'TO reforms have been proposed to improve the transparency of the dispute settlement
process by opening hearings and arguments to the public, putting submissions on the public record, and
allowing amicus briefs by non-governmental organizations. Reforms also have been proposed to democratize
the WTO's negotiating processes, for example, by opening up the "Green Room" process in which potential
compromises are initially explored among a select group of \VTO Members. Such reforms would enhance the
W 0O's legitimacy. Nevertheless, the developing countries, particularly India, have resisted such reforms
fiercely for reasons that are not readily apparent.
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obligations apply narrowly to specific agreements or issues, such as publication of customs
regulations, enforcement of intellectual property rights, and science-based food safety
regulation.
If these obligations could be consolidated and clarified-"operationalized" in 'WTO/
GATT parlance-and made specifically applicable to the legal and administrative systems
of individual members, the WTO could become an important tool for strengthening the
rule of law worldwide. Unlike some so-called new issues, such as competition and invest-
ment, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT), which entered into force in
1947 and is the WNTO's predecessor institution, incorporates specific rule of law obligations.
There can be no question that rule of law issues fall squarely within the WVTO's competence
and original mandate.
HI. GATT Article X
The key GAT rule of law obligations are set out in article X, which provides:
Article X
Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations
1. Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, made
effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products
for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, re-
strictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments therefor, or
affecting their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing, inspection, exhi-
bition, processing, mixing or other use, shall be published promptly in such a manner as to enable
governments and traders to become acquainted with them. Agreements affecting international
trade policy which are in force between the government or a governmental agency of any
contracting party shall also be published. The provisions of this paragraph shall not require
any contracting party to disclose confidential information which would impede law enforce-
ment or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate
commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.
2. No measure of general application taken by any contracting party effecting an advance in a rate
of duty or other charge on imports under an established and uniform practice, or imposing
a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports, or on the
transfer of payments therefor, shall be enforced before such measure has been officially published.
3. (a) Each contracting party shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all
its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this article.
(b) Each contracting party shall maintain, or institute as soon as practicable,judicial, arbitral
or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and
correction of administrative action relating to customs matters. Such tribunals or procedures
shall be independent of the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement and their
decisions shall be implemented by, and shall govern the practice of, such agencies unless
an appeal is lodged with a court or tribunal of superior jurisdiction within the time
prescribed for appeals to be lodged by importers; Provided that the central administration
of such agency may take steps to obtain a review of the matter in another proceeding
if there is good cause to believe that the decision is inconsistent with established prin-
ciples of law or the actual facts.
(c) The provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph shall not require the elimination
or substitution of procedures in force in the territory of a contracting party on the date
of this Agreement which in fact provide for an objective and impartial review of ad-
ministrative action even though such procedures are not fully or formally independent
of the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement. Any contractingpartyemploy-
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ing such procedures shall, upon request, furnish the CONTRACTING PARTIES with
full information thereon in order that they may determine whether such procedures
conform to the requirements of this sub-paragraph.6
In short, GATT article X incorporates specific rule of law concepts and obligations, such
as:
° Transparency of trade laws, regulations, and administrative and judicial decisions.
" Prior notice of trade-related measures.
" Official publication of trade measures prior to enforcement.
" Uniform, impartial, and reasonable administration of trade laws, regulations, decisions, and
rulings.
• Independent judicial, arbitral, or administrative review of trade decisions.
" Appeal procedures permitting prompt review and correction of customs and trade decisions.
These obligations offer a foundation for future work toward improving adherence to the
rule of law by W TO Members, strengthening legal systems, ensuring greater transparency
and predictability in international commerce, and ultimately expanding trade and economic
opportunity.
Unfortunately, article X is something of a stepchild in WTO/GATT jurisprudence.
When GATT entered into force in 1947, it grandfathered the existing legal systems of
GATT Contracting Parties. Paragraph 3(c) of article X provides: "The provisions of sub-
paragraph (b) of this paragraph shall not require the elimination or substitution of proce-
dures in force in the territory of a contracting party on the date of this Agreement which
in fact provide for an objective and impartial review of administrative action even though
such procedures are not fully or formally independent of the agencies entrusted with ad-
ministration enforcement."' 7 This grandfather provision was offset to a degree by a re-
quirement that GATT Contracting Parties notify GATT of any deviations from the prin-
ciple of objective independent judicial review "in order that they may determine whether
such procedures conform to the requirements of this sub-paragraph.""' However, the article
X notification requirement has never been enforced, perhaps because the results would have
been embarrassing to many governments.
As a result, GATT article X has long been viewed as weak and ineffective. While fre-
quently cited in dispute settlement proceedings and complaints, GAIT article X is typically
an "add-on"-thrown in at the end of a long series of legal claims or findings that a pro-
tectionist measure violates more promising and enforceable VVTO rules. Indeed, WTO
and GAIT panels typically refuse to rule on article X claims if a measure has already been
found to violate another, more substantive GAT or XVFO obligation:
The Panel noted that the United States had, as a subsidiary matter, argued that Japan had also
nullified or impaired benefits under Articles II, X: I, X:3 and XIII:3. In view of the findings set
out in the paragraphs above [that the import quotas violated GATT Article XI], the Panel
found it was not necessary for it to make a finding on these matters. '
16. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), art. X, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs-e/legal-e/gatt47-01 e.htm#articleX(last visited Aug. 22, 2003) (emphasis added).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, May 15/16, 1984, GATT 31 B.I.S.D. 94,114. Seealso Republic
of Korea-Restrictions on Imports of Beef-Complaint by Australia, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT 36 B.I.S.D. 230,
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Accordingly, unlike other GAqTT/WTO obligations, interpretations and elaborations of
GATT article X has been limited. The main decision is United States-Restrictions on Imports
of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underzvear,2° in which Costa Rica challenged U.S. import
restrictions on underwear. After requesting bilateral consultations with Costa Rica under
the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Apparel on March 27, 1995, the United States im-
posed safeguard restrictions on June 23, 1995, after the consultations failed to produce a
mutually agreed solution. The import restrictions were made effective as of March 27,
1997-the date the U.S. requested consultations. The WTO Appellate Body upheld the
panel's decision to strike down the U.S. cotton underwear safeguard as a violation of GATT
article X. The decision stated the following:
Article X:2, General Agreement, may be seen to embody a principle of fundamental impor-
tance-that of promoting full disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and private
persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality. The relevant policy prin-
ciple is widely known as the principle of transparency and has obviously due process dimen-
sions. The essential implication is that Members and other persons affected, or likely to be
affected, by governmental measures imposing restraints, requirements and other burdens,
should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such measures
and accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or alternatively to seek modification of
such measures. We believe that the Panel here gave to Article X:2, General Agreement, an
interpretation that is appropriately protective of the basic principle there projected.'
The Appellate Body further concluded that the retroactive application of the U.S. safeguard,
as of the date of the original request for consultations with Costa Rica, violated the due
process rights of GATT article X:2, stating:
At the same time, we are bound to observe that Article X:2 of the General Agreement, does
not speak to, and hence does not resolve, the issue of permissibility of giving retroactive effect
to a safeguard restraint measure. The presumption of prospective effect only does, of course,
relate to the basic principles of transparency and due process, being grounded on, among other
things, these principles. But prior publication is required for all measures falling within the
scope of Article X:2, not just ATC safeguard restraint measures sought to be applied retro-
actively. Prior publication may be an autonomous condition for giving effect at all to a restraint
measure. Where no authority exists to give retroactive effect to a restrictive governmental
measure, that deficiency is not cured by publishing the measure sometime before its actual
application. The necessary authorization is not supplied by Article X:2 of the General
Agreement.21
Apart from Cotton Underzwear, there are only a handful of GATT decisions interpreting
its provisions and most are cryptic, involving only a few paragraphs or sentences. In EEC-
Restrictions on Imports of Apples, it was determined that article X:l's prior publication re-
quirement prohibits backdating of quotas. In this case, Chile complained about the EEC's
restrictions on imported apples, which included a quota allocation administered through a
restrictive licensing program in which the quota amount was not published until after the
267, 306, 1 108, 124, 130; Canada-Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, Dec. 5, 1989, 36 B.I.S.D.
68, 92.
20. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, Feb. 10, 1997,
WT/DS24/AB/R.
21. Id. at 6.3.
22. Id at 6.4.
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start of the quota year. Thus, traders were required to enter imported apples without know-
ing the full amount of quota available. As in Cotton Underwear, the panel found the EEC
measure to violate GATT article X, because it involved retroactive application of a quota:
The Panel therefore considered that the allocation of back-dated quotas did not conform to
the requirements of Article XIJI:3(b) and (c). It also interpreted the requirements of Article
X: 1 as likewise prohibiting back-dated quotas. It therefore found that the EEC had been in
breach of these requirements since it had given public notice of the quota allocation only about
two months after the quota period had begun.
2 3
IV. Rule of Law Obligations in WTO Agreements
In the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, several GATT/WTO Agreements were negotiated
that dealt with rule of law concepts, such as transparency, objective and impartial decision-
making processes, criminal and civil penalties, and rights of judicial review. These issues
were taken up on a case-by-case basis, rather than any systemic or organized fashion. How-
ever, the various WTO Agreements, nevertheless, include useful concepts of fairness and
procedural due process that could be incorporated in future trade agreements. For example:
A. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON SERVICES (GATS)
GATS article VI (Domestic Regulation) builds on GATT article X. It includes the fol-
lowing provisions:
Paragraph 1-All measures of general application affecting trade in services must be administered
in a reasonable, objective, and uniform manner
Paragraph 2-Each WTO Member must establish 'judicial, arbitral, or administration tribunals"
for prompt review of and appropriate remedies for administrative decisions affecting trade in services.
This provision is subject to a narrow exception for situations where such remedies would be
inconsistent with a WTO Member's constitution or judicial system.
Paragraph 3-Applicants must be notified within a "reasonable period of time" regarding government
regulatory decisions involving applications for authorization to provide a regulated service.
Paragraph 4-GATS Council shall aim to formulate disciplines to ensure that regulatory de-
cisions regarding an applicant's qualifications to provide a service shall be (1) based on "objective
and transparent criteria"; (2) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the
services; and (3) in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the
supply of a service.2 4
B. AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS)
Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the TRIPS Agreement set out detailed obligations regarding
civil proceedings provisional measures (such as injunctions), border enforcement, and crim-
inal penalties for willful infringement. For example:
23. European Economic Community-Restrictions on Imports of Apples, Complaint by the United States,
June 22, 1989 36 B.I.S.D. 135, 166-67.
24. General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. VI, available at http://www.wto.org/englishldocse/
legal-e/26-gats.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2003) (emphasis added).
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Section 2-Civil and Administrative Procedures and Remedies
Article 42-WTO Members shall providefair and equitable civiljudicial procedures for enforcing
intellectual property rights, including timely written notice, representation by independent legal coun-
sel, right to substantiate claims and present all relevant evidence.
Article 43-Judicial authorities shall have authority to order evidence within control of
opposing party to be produced, and to impose sanctions for non-compliance, i.e., discovery.
Article 44-Judicial authorities shall be empowered to issue injunctions.
Article 45-Judicial authorities shall have the authority to order infringers to "pay the right
holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered because of
an infringement" and to order payment of expenses, including attorney's fees.
Article 46-Judicial authorities shall have the authority to order destruction or disposal of
infringing merchandise.
Article 48-Judicial authorities shall have the authority to require persons who abuse en-
forcement procedures to provide adequate compensation for such abuse.
Section 3-Provisional Measures
Article 50 requires specific procedures for provisional measures, e.g., injunctions against
infringing merchandise.
Section 5-Criminal Procedures
Article 61-V TO Members shall provide criminal procedures and penalties at least in cases
involving willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Rem-
edies shall include "imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent."2 5
C. AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE (TBT)
The TBT sets out requirements for WTO Members when promulgating technical stan-
dards, such as product quality, safety, packaging, marking, and labeling requirements, and
conformity assessment procedures for evaluating whether specific products comply with
technical standards. While the TBT requires adoption of international standards where
feasible and creates a rebuttable presumption that any measure, which is in accordance with
the relevant international standard, does not create unnecessary barriers to trade in violation
of the WTO, it also creates rules for situations where no international standard exists or a
WTO Member's standard differs from the international standard. Some of these procedures
are described below.
1. Notice of Proposed Technical Standards
WTO Members are required to publish notice of a proposed technical regulation at an
early appropriate stage "in such a manner as to enable interested parties in other Members
to become acquainted with it."26 Thus, private parties, e.g., companies, must be given notice
of a proposed technical regulation.
25. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Part III, §§ 2-5, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/2 7-trips.pdf(last visited Aug. 22, 2003) (emphasis added).
26. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. II, ] 2.9.1, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs e/legal-e/l 7-tbt.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2003).
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Timely notice of a proposed technical regulation must also be given to other WTO
Members at an early appropriate stage, which is defined as a point "when amendments can
still be introduced and comments taken into account."
2 7
WTO Members must provide a "reasonable time" for other WTO Members to file
comments in writing, discuss the comments upon request, and "take these written com-
ments and the results of these discussions into account" in formulating a final standard.z8
2. Notice and Comment for Conformity Assessment Procedures
Similar notice and comment requirements apply to the formulation of conformity as-
sessment procedures for evaluating whether a product complies with a technical standard.
3. Notice and Comment by Local Governments and Private Standard-Setting Bodies
Since the responsibility of formulating technical standards is often delegated by the fed-
eral government to local authorities or to private entities, VVTO notice and comment re-
quirements are made effective for local governments and non-governmental standardizing
bodies through article 4.1, which requires WTO Members to take reasonably available
steps to ensure that such local and private entities comply with a "Code of Good Practice
for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards."2 9 The Code requires a min-
imum sixty-day period for interested parties of other WTO Members to file comments on
a proposed standard or conformity assessment procedure, and publication of timely and
effective notice of the opportunity for comment prior to the start of the comment period.
D. BASic TELECOMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENT
The GATS Annex on Telecommunications provides specific obligations regarding basic
telecommunications services, including: (1) transparency of conditions for access to tele-
communications networks and services, specifications of technical interfaces, standards-
setting bodies affecting for standards affecting access and notifications, regulations, and
licensing requirements; and (2) reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions
for access to public telecommunications transportation networks. The Basic Telecommu-
nications Agreement incorporates a "Reference Paper" spelling out good regulatory prac-
tices, including: (1) competitive safeguards to prevent anti-competitive practices by major
suppliers; (2) inter-connection rights, allowing foreign providers to link up to domestic
telecommunications network under transparent, non-discriminatory terms, conditions, and
procedures; (3) dispute settlement regarding interconnection disputes by an independent
domestic body; and (4) public availability of licensing criteria. Importantly, the Reference
Paper requires that administration be an independent body: "The regulatory body is sepa-
rate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services. The
decisions of and the procedures used by regulators shall be impartial with respect to all
market participants."3 0
27. Id. 2.9.2.
28. Id. 1 2.9.4.
29. Id. annex 3.
30. Telecommunications Services: Reference Paper (Apr. 24, 1996), availableathttp://Nxww.wto.org/english/
tratop e/serv-e/telecone/tel23_e.htm.
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E. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AGREEMENT
Finally, the Government Procurement Code seeks to open up government contracts for
goods and services through "transparency of laws, regulations, procedures and practices
regarding government procurement."3  It incorporates specific obligations regarding:
(1) tendering procedures; (2) qualification of suppliers; (3) timely publication of any con-
ditions for participation; (4) publication of invitations for participation in proposed pro-
curements; (5) "fair and non-discriminatory" selection procedures; (6) adequate time limits
and deadlines; (7) submission, receipt, and opening of tenders "under procedures and con-
ditions guaranteeing the regularity of the openings"; (8) contracts must be awarded to the
entity determined to be "fully capable of undertaking the contract" and which is either the
lowest bidder or offers the "most advantageous" tender; and (9) transparency of terms and
conditions12 Importantly, article XX of the Code requires that each Member establish
"challenge procedures" providing non-discriminatory, timely, transparent, and effective
procedures for losing suppliers to challenge alleged breaches of the agreement. Such chal-
lenges must be heard by a "court or by an impartial and independent review body with no
interest in the outcome of the procurement and the members of which are secure from
external influence." Any review body must incorporate key elements of judicial procedure,
including representation of participants, access to the proceeding, issuance of written de-
cision or opinions, and the right to present witnesses and submit documents. Such review
bodies must be empowered to issue rapid interim relief to preserve commercial opportu-
nities, such as through a preliminary injunction, and to correct breaches of the Agreement
or to order compensation for losses or damages suffered.
V. U.S.-Japan Deregulation and Structural Reform
Negotiations
To date, the best precedent for a rule of law negotiation is the prolonged campaign by
the United States to secure greater transparency, judicial review, and improved administra-
tive procedures in Japan. While U.S. trade negotiators initially focused on eliminating
protectionist Japanese tariffs and quotas, it quickly became apparent that the formal, obvious
barriers were not the principal obstacle to United States goods and services. Instead, U.S.
exports were excluded by a host of informal and obscure exclusionary business practices,
rooted in Japanese culture and the Keiretsu system, and often aided and abetted by Japanese
Ministries with close ties to regulated industries under their jurisdiction. Thus, beginning
in 1985, with the Market-Oriented Sector-Selective (MOSS)3 3 talks, the U.S. began seeking
Japanese commitments to simplify and clarify administrative procedures, particularly in the
telecommunications, forest products, electronics, and pharmaceuticals and medical devices
sectors (Med-Pharm). The aim was to improve market access for U.S. goods and services
through a more transparent, non-discriminatory, and rule-based Japanese regulatory sys-
tem. For example, the 1985 MOSS Med-Pharm Agreement stated (emphasis added):
31. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), Agreement on Government Procure-
ment, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/gpr-94-e.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2003).
32. Id.
33. Despite an unfortunate choice of name, MOSS continues to this day while many U.S. -Japan initiatives
have fallen by the wayside.
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The Japanese side responded that the Japanese regulatory system neither overtly nor covertly
discriminated against foreign firms in favor of domestic ones, providing both with equal op-
portunities to enter the health care market. It recognized, however, the importance of simplifying
administrative procedures, eliminating administrative delays, and increasing transparency, for firther
facilitating access to Japan's market and strengthening the free trade system. TheJapanese side agreed
to discuss and seek solutions to the issues as presented in this way.1
4
To this end, Japan committed, under MOSS, to reform specific elements of its health
care regulatory system relating, for example, to testing and test data for new product ap-
provals, foreign clinical data, approval and licensing processes, linkages between product
approval (shonin) and the setting of reimbursement prices under the National Health In-
surance (NHI) system, and the reimbursement pricing system itself. These highly specific
and sectoral Japanese commitments were designed to streamline the approval and pricing
of U.S. medical devices and pharmaceuticals, and thus to expand market access in a sector
in which the United States is a world leader.
The MOSS Med-Pharm Agreement also tried to address the "transparency" of Japan's
regulatory procedures. Building on a pledge by then Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone to
"increase transparency in all regulatory bodies," the Agreement set out a series of Japanese
transparency commitments. 5 The Med-Pharm Agreement, for example, required the Cen-
tral Pharmaceutical Affairs Council (Chuikyo), an advisory body responsible for providing
scientific advice to the Ministry of Health and Welfare on medical and drug product ap-
provals, to make its "Common Instructions" public and hold meetings to explain them.1
6
It provided that foreign applicants for new drug approvals would be permitted to hear
instructions from CPAC members, ask questions, and comment on the Council's instruc-
tion. Foreign as well as domestic industries would be permitted to provide views to the
Chuikyo, regarding reimbursement policy issues when changes to the NHI drug pricing
rules or medical fee schedule were being considered.
The U.S. goal was to open up the "black box" of MHW's pricing and reimbursement
decision-making and rule-making processes to American health care companies. Such trans-
parency is important in a universal health care system like Japan, where access to the NHI's
reimbursement schedule effectively determines market access for U.S. medicines and de-
vices. In effect, the MOSS Agreement shows how general commitments to administrative
simplification and transparency over time can be translated into specific incremental reg-
ulatory reform commitments that address key procedures and administrative processes for
particular products.
In 1989, the Bush administration launched a follow-on "Structural Impediments Initia-
tive" (SII) aimed at identifying and solving structural barriers in both the U.S. and Japanese
economies that impeded trade and balance of payments adjustment. While SII focused on
a broad range of macroeconomic barriers, several were noteworthy from a rule of law
perspective.
First, the SI Agreement contains specific commitments to improve enforcement of Ja-
pan's Anti-Monopoly Act (AMA), by increasing the budget and staffing of the Fair Trade
34. Report on Medical Equipment and Pharmaceuticals Market-Oriented, Sector-Selective (MOSS) Dis-
cussions by the U.S. and Japan (MOSS) Negotiating Teams (Jan. 9, 1986), available at http://185.106/tccldata/
commerce-htmlIFCCdocuments/Japan.. ./JapanMOSS.htm.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 14.
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Commission (JFTC). These commitments focused on beefing up the JFTC's investigative
functions and ability to collect proof of illegal activities, increasing its reliance on formal
enforcement actions (as opposed to informal and non-transparent guidance or exhorta-
tions), increasing the use of criminal penalties, and studying whether the AMA's damage
remedy system was sufficient to deter anticompetitive conduct, bid-rigging, and cartels.
While Japan's antitrust enforcement remains notoriously weak and ineffective, the SII
Agreement at least began a long-term process of reform which has already somewhat
strengthened the FTC's capabilities and has the potential to do more, particularly since the
Koizumi administration now appears to agree that cartels and anticompetitive practices are
an impediment to Japan's competitiveness and a sustained economic recovery.
Second, the SII Agreement sought to limit the use of informal bureaucratic procedures
and practices, which seriously handicapped foreign firms and contributed to discriminatory
government regulations. Thus, with respect to the practice of Japanese Ministries relying
on informal "administrative guidance," the SII Agreement provides:
The Government of Japan will implement its administrative guidance in writing as much as
possible. It will make administrative guidance public when it is implemented, unless there are
strong reasons not to do so, for example, when it is related to national security or when a
publication of the administrative guidance causes, or may cause, such harm as might result
from divulgence of trade secrets. 7
Similarly, SII sought to open up the Japanese government's advisory and study group
processes. In Japan, major policy and rule changes are frequently developed and drafted by
advisory committees composed of academics, ministry officials, and industry representa-
tives, who together prepare recommendations for the ministry or review proposals devel-
oped by the ministry staff. The lack of transparency of the advisory group processes and
exclusionary membership of the key committees and study groups often contributed to the
collusive drafting of protectionist or exclusionary government standards and regulations.
By limiting membership to ministry bureaucrats and Japanese industry representatives, the
advisory committee or "Bukai" process effectively excluded the views of foreign producers,
putting them at a competitive disadvantage, and sometimes resulting in outrageously pro-
tectionist or discriminatory regulations.
Accordingly, the SII Agreement provided that the results of advisory committee and study
group processes: (1) shall be made public, (2) shall invite members who can represent con-
sumers if the discussions relate to consumer interests, (3) hear the opinions of foreigners
or foreign industry representatives, and (4) shall not result in barriers to trade. While the
SIT reforms were somewhat vague and lacking in specificity, they represented a first step
towards reform of the government advisory committee process, which continues to this
day.
Many of the unilateral U.S. trade tools used in the 1980s to pry open theJapanese market
have fallen by the wayside, but the United States and Japan have continued to pursue
structural reform, de-regulation, and transparency. In 1997, after a brief flirtation with
"manage trade" under the U.S.-Japan Framework Agreement, the Clinton administration
resumed work on structural issues under the Enhanced De-Regulation and Competi-
tion Policy Initiative (EDI), at the Denver G-8 Economic Summit. The Enhanced
37. SII Agreement, at IV-8.
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De-Regulation Initiative built on the SII and MOSS, while incorporating a more concrete,
sectoral focus.
Under EDI, the U.S. and Japanese negotiators summarized the progress in each of the
various sectors in an annual report, which was made public at the bilateral meeting of the
U.S. President and Japanese Prime Minister at the G-8 Economic Summit. At the
Birmingham G-8 Economic Summit, the Japanese Government made the following
commitment:
In order to ensure the transparency in the consideration of health care policies, . . . allow
foreign pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers meaningful opportunities to state
their opinions in the relevant [Advisory] councils on an equal basis with Japanese manufactur-
ers, and provide them on their request with opportunities to exchange views with MHW
officials at all levels.
Accordingly, the Birmingham Agreement committed the Ministry of Health and Welfare
38
to: (1) transparency, (2) meaningful consultation with U.S. industry stakeholders on an equal
basis with Japanese industry, and (3) an opportunity for U.S. industry to exchange views
with officials at all levels of the ministry. While Japan did not take the final step of allowing
U.S. companies to be represented on Chuikyo and other advisory groups, Birmingham did
have the effect of greatly expanding opportunities for U.S. companies to participate in the
formulation of Japanese health policy, to understand potential reforms being considered by
the ministry and Chuikyo, and to engage in genuine dialogue with key Japanese bureaucrats.
In addition, the MHW took the further step of establishing a Pharmaceutical Study Group,
consisting of three domestic and foreign trade associations-the Federation of Japanese
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (FPMAJ), European Business Council, and Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of American (PhRMA)-to discuss drug pricing policy and
potential pricing rule changes. The result was a productive industry dialogue that broadly
represented the views of innovative domestic and foreign companies.
In the Birmingham Agreement, Japan committed to consider "public comment proce-
dures for the introduction, amendment, and abolition of regulations,"' 9 roughly analogous
to U.S. notice and comment rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedures
Act. In March 1999, the Japanese cabinet adopted Public Comment Procedures for For-
mulating, Amending, or Repealing a Regulation.
In the First Report to the Leaders on the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy
Initiative, Japan stated that it had adopted a "Law Concerning Access to Information Held
by Independent Administrative Institutions, etc.," which provided the right to request dis-
closure of information held by independent administrative institutions, public corporations,
and required public corporations to inform the public of their activities. ° This was effec-
tively a Japanese version of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
38. The Ministry of Health and Welfare has now been renamed the "Ministry of Health, Labor, and Wel-
fare" as a result of a major reorganization of the Japanese government, which led to the merger of various
ministries.
39. First Joint Status Report on the U.S.-Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition
Policy, Section H-Transparency and Other Government Practices (May 15, 1998), available at hrtp://
www.ustr.gov/releases/1998/05/status.pdf.
40. First Report to the Leaders on the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative,
Section VII, Transparency and Other Government Practices, Paragraph C (June 25, 2002), available at
htp://ww.ustr.gov/regions/japan/2002-06-25_report-to-leaders.pdf.
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While most U.S. administrations typically seek to differentiate themselves from the mis-
begotten policies of their predecessors, the Bush administration continued the EDI and SII
approach under the new rubric of the "U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition
Initiative," 4' and retained many of the key elements of previous de-regulation efforts, such
as annual reports to the president and prime minister, sectoral working groups, and focus
on de-regulation and structural reform.
The MOSS, SIT, EDI, and RRCI have been useful and have contributed to progress on
transparency and administrative reform. None of these initiatives have been a "silver bullet,"
which would solve, for all time, longstanding U.S. frustrations regarding Japanese market
access barriers. The U.S. sectors covered by Japanese structural reform commitments, such
as pharmaceuticals, medical devices, telecommunications, and financial services have done
quite well in Japan, but progress has required intensive ongoing negotiations for over a
decade and painstaking attention to changing specific Japanese rules, regulations, guide-
lines, and procedures. Japan remains a difficult and frustrating place to do business for
American companies, but it would be an even more frustrating and intractable market if
there was not a MOSS, SII, EDI, or RRCI.
VI. WTO Rule of Law Negotiations
The Doha WTO Round already represents an enormous commercial opportunity for
the United States. Expanding the VTO agenda to cover rule of law issues would not just
advance U.S. values, but also the interests of America's businesses, workers, and farmers in
open, stable, and predictable access to foreign markets. The Doha Round provides an op-
portunity to build a WTO consensus on principles of legal conduct, transparency, and due
process, and for locking in specific commitments to honor these principles in all WTO
agreements, now and in the future. This would not require much, if anything, from the
United States, since a firm commitment to the rule of law already stands as the foundation
of America's entire legal and administrative system.
It is clearly in the interest of our trading partners to embrace these principles, but our
farmers, manufacturers, financial service companies, high tech innovators, and workers in
all industries will also benefit from the adoption of these sound legal principles and regu-
latory best practices by other countries. Such reforms would offer safeguards against pro-
tectionist or discriminatory actions in markets where governments traditionally have been
allowed to run amok.
The WTO's present obligations with respect to transparency, regulatory notice and com-
ment procedures, and judicial review currently are scattered through various agreements.
Most are specifically limited to traditional trade matters, such as customs classification and
valuation. While rule of law issues are sometimes discussed, the WTO's structure of sepa-
rate negotiating groups has prevented a comprehensive solution. Instead of this scattershot
approach, the WTO should launch a single set of negotiations that cover all rule of law
issues in a comprehensive way. The aim would be to clarify, strengthen, and make more
effective the obligations already set out in GATT article X.
In addition, the scope of such obligations should be clarified and expanded to cover all
laws, regulations, and administrative and regulatory procedures that affect international
41. Id.
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trade and market access for goods, services, agricultural products, intellectual property, and
other sectors covered by WTO Agreements. Finally, core rule of law requirements could
be fashioned, including some or all of the following:
" Transparency of laws, regulations, administrative and judicial decisions.
" Prior notice of trade-related measures.
" Notice and comment procedures for trade-related administrative and regulatory procedures
and decisions, including transparent, non-discriminatory, meaningful, and good faith op-
portunities for foreign stakeholders to submit comments, participate in hearings and of-
ficial and quasi-official advisory groups, and provide their views on regulatory matters
affecting their interests in such a way that their views will be heard.
" Official publication of trade-related measures prior to enforcement.
" Uniform, impartial, and reasonable administration of trade-related laws, regulations, deci-
sions, and rulings.
" Access to information.
" Transparent administrative procedures.
* Some level of minimum due process, e.g., right to submit evidence, right to counsel, access
to information, right to a public hearings, and written decisions with sufficient detail to
permit effective appellate review.
* Independent judicial, arbitral, or administrative review of trade-related decisions.
" Appeal procedures permitting prompt review and correction of trade-related decisions, includ-
ing review by an independent and objective judicial, arbitral, or administrative body.
Such core obligations could operate as a minimum floor for all WTO Members, establish-
ing a worldwide baseline for adherence to the rule of law. While such an approach would
be incremental and would not lead to overnight change, it would commence a long-term
process of improving legal systems in WTO Members. Of course, sustaining such progress
would also require capacity-building and financial and technical assistance for the devel-
oping countries.
In fashioning a rule of law agreement, the WTO must avoid an impractical a one-size-
fits-all approach. A level of obligation that works for advanced industrialized countries, like
the United States and the European Union, may not be feasible for an impoverished de-
veloping country with a grossly inadequate legal system. Moreover, the world has a host of
different legal traditions, including common law and civil law, which have resulted in very
different legal systems in the United States, Continental Europe, Latin America, and Asia.
Adopting a single standard for all countries and across all legal systems could produce a
lowest common denominator that turns out to be very low indeed.
There is a solution. While setting minimum baseline standards regarding transparency,
objective and impartial decision-making, and a right to independent judicial review that
would operate as a commitment floor for all WTO Members, the WTO simultaneously
should initiate Doha Round negotiations in which countries would enter into individual
commitments regarding specific rule of law issues (similar to the approach already employed
by the WTO tariff, services market access, and agricultural subsidy and market access ne-
gotiations). These commitments would be set out in each WTO Member's schedule of
commitments. This approach would permit an outcome tailored to the circumstances and
level of development of each country. For example, if a country's trading partners believe
that the country requires excessive regulatory red tape and does not provide effective appeal
rights for investors, improvements could be negotiated and set out in a schedule. If a
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country's trading partners think that a VVTO Member's failure to enforce its labor or
environmental laws represents an indirect subsidy to its industries, they could seek to ne-
gotiate specific commitments to improve such enforcement.
Such an approach would also permit a greater degree of flexibility, while facilitating
horse-trading on specific points of concern about a member's legal system. For example,
even if the WTO does not launch broad competition and investment negotiations at the
Mexico Ministerial, specific competition and investment issues in individual WTO Mem-
bers could nevertheless be brought into the negotiations through specific commitments in
a country's schedule. This would allow the WTO to address, for example, improved in-
vestment protections against expropriations of foreign property and improved antitrust
enforcement.
Finally, the WTO would be wise to limit the scope of dispute settlement review of rule
of law obligations to systemic issues, as opposed to the outcome of specific legal disputes.
The WTO dispute settlement process would be inundated if it were to become the final
global court of appeal for each and every judicial or administrative decision in each of its
142 Members. Instead, WTO dispute settlement should focus on systemic failures or de-
ficiencies that reflect broad weaknesses in a WTO Member's legal or administrative pro-
cedures, as opposed to becoming a final court of appeal for specific judicial or administrative
decisions.
The upside for the United States of a WTO Agreement on the Rule of Law would be
substantial. Many of America's most competitive industries face regulatory barriers around
the world. The most innovative U.S. industries-high technology, telecommunications,
financial services, pharmaceuticals-medical devices, and biotechnology-are also among the
most highly-regulated and often must overcome extensive regulatory and licensing hurdles
before new products are allowed on the market. American companies often seek to establish
a direct commercial presence in overseas markets in order to serve their customers, but
encounter government restrictions on foreign direct investment. America's highly com-
petitive farmers are the world's leading targets of disguised regulatory and food safety
barriers. Finally, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prevents U.S. companies from cutting
regulatory and legal corners-unlike some of their foreign competitors. A more open, trans-
parent, rule-based, global operating environment stands to benefit the United States and
helps U.S. companies access new markets and introduce innovative new products without
excessive red tape and delays.
A W-TO rule of law negotiation would not be a panacea. The negotiations would nec-
essarily be incremental, and initial commitments from many WTO Members likely would
be limited. Countries with weak legal systems or a tradition of corruption would resist
expanding the WTO agenda. The developing world should understand by now that it too
will benefit from improvements in the rule of law, since shortcomings in that area are a
major impediment to attracting foreign direct investment. However, the developing coun-
tries have been among the strongest opponents of increased transparency in the WTO
dispute settlement process. Finally, there will be naysayers, since these negotiations would
probably focus more on commercial issues than on topics such as human rights. However,
freedoms, once achieved, are very difficult to remove, and transparency is an effective an-
tidote to government abuse. Once rule of law principles are adopted in a commercial setting,
it is a short step to adopting them far more broadly-in the human rights arena and else-
where. Governments that agree to transparency, due process, and judicial review for com-
mercial matters may attempt to withhold such rights elsewhere in society, but this will turn
out to be a losing proposition.
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For the better part of a century, America has helped build an open rules-based global
trading system. With U.S. leadership, the trade agenda has been expanded beyond customs
and tariffs to non-tariff barriers, services, intellectual property, agriculture, and food safety.
As the world's preeminent superpower, the United States needs a strong rules-based mul-
tilateral system that brings together, not divides, Europe, North America, Latin America,
Asia, and Africa. A comprehensive WTO agreement involving more than 130 countries is
the most efficient way to leverage access to our market, gain greater access to a worldwide
marketplace in which more than 90 percent of our potential customers live outside the
United States, and ensure that trade remains an engine for global growth and prosperity.
Trade has long expressed America's fundamental goals and values in a pragmatic way. As
President Reagan said: "In dealing with our economy, more is in question than just pros-
perity. The United States took the lead after World War II in creating an international
trading and financial system that limited government's ability to disrupt trade. We did this
because history taught us the freer the flow of trade across borders, the greater the world
economic progress and the greater the impetus for world peace.""2 Every American wants
to see progress on the rule of law and human rights. It is important for the United States
to continue to take the lead in fashioning a bold and ambitious WTO agenda, which ad-
dresses both America's commercial priorities and our deeply held values.
42. Business Coalition, China PNTR: Advancing American Values (Apr. 26, 2000), available at http://
www.uschina.org/publidwto/usavalues.html.
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